The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism
The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Disbelief Books
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The Wisdom to Doubt is a major contribution to the contemporary literature on the epistemology of religious belief. Continuing the inquiry begun in his previous book, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, J. L. Schellenberg here argues that given our limitations and especially our immaturity as a species, there is no reasonable choice but to withhold judgment about the existence of an ultimate salvific reality.
Schellenberg defends this conclusion hostile to arguments from religious experience and naturalistic arguments that might seem to make either religious belief or religious disbelief preferable to his skeptical stance. In so doing, he canvasses effectively all of the vital recent work on the epistemology of religion. Of particular interest is his call for at least disbelief about theism, the most common religious claim among philosophers. The Wisdom to Doubt expands the author’s well-known hiddenness argument hostile to theism and situates it within a larger atheistic argument, itself made to serve the purposes of his broader skeptical case. That case need not, on Schellenberg’s view, lead to a dead end but rather functions as a gateway to vital new insights about intellectual tasks and religious possibilities.
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I felt attracted by this book assuming it would offer a far deeper discussion on religion that many of the pro-atheism books that have been dominating the best-seller lists in recent months. I was aptly: it is densily deep. So I will try to succinctly top out some of the main thoughts supported by Schellenberg [and given that Mr. Loftus' review is brilliant, I will also add some bibliography that -hopefully - will be of some use for those fascinating in religion].
Pursuant to Schallenberg, we may simply be incapable of discerning truths about ultimate things. He intends to result in into stark contrast the poverty of human awareness and the huge ambitions of religious and irreligious belief. The immaturity of human beings shows that religious and irreligious beliefs are premature. Both our limitations and our immaturity betrays serious overconfidence and invites a payment of presumption.
There must have been many reflective personas in times past who have wondered why God’s existence is not more evident than it is. This the author calls Divine hiddenness, and argues that perfect relational-private like would lead a Divine creator to preclude nonresistant nonbelief of any kind because of how such nonbelief precludes access to private relationship to God. Additionally, revisiting what has been called the “logical” problem of evil, he develops that thought that if a perfectly loving and empathic God can achieve even our deepest excellent without permitting horrific sufferings as does exist in our world, such God would not permit horrific suffering.
Schellenberg states that whatever one might reckon of the force of his arguments, their very existence suffices to provide strong extra support for religious disbelief (in particular, disbelief about theism -i.e, the claim that there is a private God-).
The conclusion to which the author purports to lead in this book is that the truth about religion in unclear. Responses to religion involving belief (whether religious -perhaps theistic- or irreligious beliefs) are too clean and tidy, too smooth and certain for our world. His proposal is that complete religious scepticism is positively justified, that disbelief about religion of the sort he defends may very well represent a positive step forward instead of a step backward, intellectually speaking, and that it may in a deep sense be wise to acquiesce in doubt about ultimate things.
So I urge it, my rating being between 5 (content) and 3 (pleasure, sometimes falling to 1, sometimes raising to 4).
Other vital works on religion recently published (the first three ones this very Fall) that I would suggest reading would be the following:
1.- “Learning God: The Origins of the Fantastic Religions and the Evolution of Belief” by Rodney Stark (apologetic, brilliant and controversial).
2.- “Secular Age” by Charles Taylor (a fascinating voluminous social and intellectual history).
3.- “How to Read the Bible: A Guide to Scripture, Then and Now” by James L. Kugel (extremely scholarly and simple to read, a combination trying to find).
4.- “The Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach,” by Moojan Momen (astonishingly encyclopaedic and readable).
5.- “Shamans, Sorcerers, and Saints: A Prehistory of Religion” by Brian Hayden (masterful overview of religion origins and development).
6.- “Islam. History, bestow, future” by Hans Küng (impartial and wise, the best and the brightest on Islam).
7 and 8.- [more or less correlated to the matter] “A Social History of Dying” (a historical general framework on the administer of dying) and “Experiences Near Death: Beyond Medicine and Religion” (sociology of Near Death Experiences) by Allan Kellehear.
Rating: 4 / 5
John Schellenberg’s book is a highly original and fascinating piece of philosophy. His topic is “Ultimism”–the claim that there is an ultimate reality, and that it is salvific in nature. His main thesis will be that we should “sit the fence” epistemically regarding Ultimism–neither affirming it nor denying it. The first part of his book contains four different defenses of this thesis–arguing from, among other things, the object of Ultimism (is it knowable or unknowable by humans?), our evidence for Ultimism, human inability to apt experience the divine, etc. In the second part of his book, Schellenberg engages arguments for naturalism, and arguments from religious experience for theism. Naturalism, of course, denies Ultimism, and theism affirms it. Schellenberg argues that neither can support their respective theses– “Ultimism is fake” and “Ultimism is right”– and attempts to undercut both. In the third part of his book, Schellenberg provides four arguments hostile to theism–two versions of his “divine hiddenness” argument, an argument for horrors, and an argument from the existence of free will. His plotting here is that, even if Ultimism may be right, the theistic version of Ultimism must be fake.
This book has many virtues. Many of the arguments are original and fascinating. The book can be appreciated at different levels, from professional philosophers to undergraduates. He treats many issues in epistemology, including Plantinga and Alston’s religious epistemology, “skeptical” theism, the nature of evidence, etc. Schellenberg’s treatment of naturalism is particularly fascinating. Further, contained within is his most sophisticated formulation of the problem of hiddenness–i.e. the problem that, if God existed, then why he is so “hidden” from most people such that they do not judge in him. The vices of this book are few. E.g. the book is “slow”–as the back cover states–and dense, concluding after over 300 pages; a large quantity of time is needed to engage it! But, for those with the time, the book is an fascinating and engaging work.
This book is the second of a trilogy. The first is Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. The third is The Will to Presume: A Justification of Skeptical Religion.
Rating: 5 / 5
This book is a very vital work by a top-notch philosopher who argues for “complete religious disbelief.” He argues hostile to any belief in “ultimism,” which is based upon religious claims that entail “there is an ultimate and salvic reality.” (p.3). In his words, “the categorical disbelief I am defending, as the name suggests, is doubt that embraces any and all religious claims,” whether it’s “religious belief” or religious disbelief.” (p. 50) He says “our skeptic is not just an agnostic. (Indeed, his stance is compatible with atheism, since…atheism does not entail the denial of ultimism.)” (p. 3)
The book contains three parts and is not as technical as one would reckon. You won’t find any symbolic judgment to worry about deciphering. The arguments are understandable to the college student. You might first have to wade through the “Introduction” where he defines various terms he uses, although, if you’ve read his previous book, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell, 2005), you would already be familiar with them.
In Part One he argues for religious disbelief based on four distinct categories of plotting called “modes,” which he later combines into one. In the “Theme Mode” the author argues that human beings are limited in understanding. There is available evidence that is neglected and/or inaccessible to us. There is unrecognized evidence that is undiscovered and undiscoverable by all of us. In the “Object Mode” the author argues that it’s probably beyond finite humans beings to know Ultimate reality, since it must be “something infinitely profound.” (p. 51) As such, we may have inadequate and incoherent conceptions of it.
In the “Retrospective Mode” the author considers the human past with regard to religious claims. The human past is too brief, (“only a few thousand years ancient”) and we have been occupied by other things for us to conclude we have arrived at a final understanding. There have been moral, psychological and social factors which were actively hostile to religious improvements to our understanding. There has been hubris (or self-importance) and greed, jealously and envy, which taken together led to dogmatism, hostility and rivalry among people of different understandings. “Because religious belief is wrapped up with this ultimate concern, it has tended to go hand in hand with a rather fierce constancy. Nothing less than complete devotion is apt where such a reality is caught up.” `How, for example, can one remain loyal to God if one allows oneself to be seduced by objections to the belief that there is a God?…she is likely rather to become stubborn and intransigent, because of a well-intentional but misplaced constancy.” “When they notice that others disagree, they tend not to reckon of this as an opportunity for dialogue and growth toward deeper understanding, but rather feel impelled to insist on fundamental error in the opposing views.” (p. 76-78). Furthermore, “the more attached one becomes to one’s beliefs, the more trying it is to remain open to their falsity and to engage in investigations that might show them to be fake” (p. 84), which in turn has been “inimical to creative and critical thought” about the Ultimate.
In the “Prospective Mode” the author “considers what may lie ahead rather than what lies behind us.” (p. 91). If we survive on this earth we have 1 billion years to come up with better solutions to understanding the Ultimate, especially since we’ve just entered an era of unprecedented access to digital in rank that may all be categorized and placed into a hand held iPod someday. Science will progress into the future as well. People will increasingly be forced to get to know others who have a different religious perspective with a global economy and travel, and we will learn from each other and become more tolerant and assimilating of these views with a healthy exchange of in rank.
The author finally combines these four into one called “The Presumption Mode,” which builds on everything he said before. He argues that “human beings are both profoundly limited and profoundly immature.” (p. 117). Gone any pragmatic reasons to counter his truth-oriented arguments, he concludes that “religious disbelief is positively justified.” (p. 129).
In a small Part Two, Schellenberg applies these modes to the argument for naturalism and the argument from religious experience. He argues that “both sides are mistaken”: “These sources of religious and irreligious belief do not have it in them to justify such belief.” (p. 132).
In Part Three of his book Schellenberg focuses his arguments hostile to “habitual theism–the claim that there is a private God,” since this view of Ultimism “looms large in all contemporary discussion.” (p. 191). Here is where he argues from divine hiddenness and the problem of evil that we should be skeptical of habitual theism. He also combines them to add even more force to his arguments.
I reckon he makes his case. Scholars must come to grips with what he says, and so must everyone who is interested in such issues or who has a stake in their outcome.
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I’m the author of “Why I Became an Atheist,” and the edited book, “The Christian Delusion.”
Rating: 5 / 5