Consciousness and Experience
Consciousness and Experience Books
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“The mind has no unique properties that are not exhausted by its representational properties, by the side of with or in combination with the functional organization of its components. It would follow that once representation itself is (eventually) understood, then not only consciousness in our bestow sense but prejudice, qualia, `what it’s like,’ and every other aspect of the mental will be explicable in terms of representation together with the underlying functionally organized neurophysiology. . . . I do not reckon there will be any `problem of consciousness’ left.” — William Lycan
This sequel to Lycan’s Consciousness (1987) continues the elaboration of his general functionalist theory of consciousness, answers the critics of his earlier work, and expands the range of discussion to deal with the many new issues and arguments that have arisen in the intervening years — an extraordinarily fertile period for the philosophical investigation of consciousness. Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments hostile to materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the structure of the mind, he also targets the set of really hard problems at the focal top of the theory of consciousness: prejudice, qualia, and the felt aspect of experience. The key to his own enlarged and honestly argued position, which he calls the “hegemony of representation,” is that there is no more to mind or consciousness than can be accounted for in terms of intentionality, functional organization, and in particular, second-order representation of one’s own mental states. A Bradford Book
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In the introduction to this book, Lycan isolates no fewer than eight uses of the term ‘conscious’ and fifteen candidates for what one might mean by ‘the problem of consciousness’.
Lycan’s points are clear and direct. One everlastingly knows _exactly_ what come forth is being addressed, which is no small accomplishment in this field.
Rating: 5 / 5
I really regret having taken so long to get to read this book. It is surely one of the fantastic contributons to the consicousness debate, although it may not have been as influential as Lycans previous book, Consicousness. There are some aspects of this book that really separate it from many others, but there are things that are to be expected in any philosophy book on consicousness as well.
One of the things in the first group of things I mentioned, is Lycans ability to clarify just just so what is the problem. He manages to define 8 diferent concepts of consicousness, and over 14 problems as regards these concepts, in just the first chapter. This is no simple task on its own, but it is also a very vital one. Although by realizing all these concepts and problems may be players in the study of consicousness, one realizes that many authors have been talking about different things all by the side of, it also makes things simple for the reader, because one is certain of what just so Lycan will be talking about. This is not to say that his discussions concern just one or another of these concepts. He really goes trhough quite a number of them.
Now Lycans position is clear. He is a representationalist, and his thesis, wich he defends by the side of the whole book, is that all consicous states are exhausted by their representational properties plus the functional organization of the system. The view itself is not absolutely new. Many others are representationalists (notably Dretske and Tye). But the fine points, the details, are different. And it is because of these differences that one can see the strenghts of Lycans position.
Lycan then, in this book, aims to clarify his thoughts on consicousness and qualia. These are not equivalent, Lycan argues. Consciousness is one thing, and qualia are other things, so to say that one is consicous of a certain qualia is not at all tautological. To Lycan qualia are first-order properties of intentional represented objects. Consicousness is the ¨internal monitoring¨ of these first order states. Much of the arguing starts here. Is this not just another higher order plotting theory? No, becuase it is not a plotting, but a ¨monitoring¨, where Lycan hold this to be to some extent perceptionlike, but not quite. Is it not that leading to infinite regress? no, because, the monitoring does not have qualia, qualia qre one thing, consicousness is another. So there is no need for another monitoring to watch the second other monitoring to make IT have qualia consicousness. This is, but, probably theme of the above mentioned previous book.
So in this book Lycan sets to defend his theory hostile to 4 objections dues to differetn philosophers. Here Lycan shows his ability as a philosopher, and argues for his position adequately. The first objection is of course that of fallibility. Can the internal watch fail? yes it can, says Lycan. So can there be unfelt pains (pains not monitored, or mismonitored)? yes. Is this sensible. Yes, argues Lycan. And he does this adequatley too. Lycan manages to make his position intellegible even when at first sight it seems that this might not be possible. This is what philosphers are supposed to do.
How about the classical problems. Levine answers Nagels well-known bat example much the same way David Papineau has in his work: Knowing about consicous mental states in a creature will not recreate these states in us. He argues Levines explanatory gap and Jacksons knowledge argument are incorrect because they both ignore modes of presentation. The explanatory gap is to be expected because the represetational functional role, and the extension of that representation can only ocurr in one person at the same time. Color blind Mary, on the other hand, does learn a new fact, but this fact is finely-grained by the mode of presentation it has. These discussions are on my attitude the books high points. Lycan finally answers all kinds of objections as regards qualia, abstract qualia, weird qualia, inversion plotting experiments, etc. In every case Lycan suceeds in defending his position, and in defending representationalism itself hostile to its oponents.
Lycan, in closing, has written an brilliant book on the philosophy of consicousness. His position is very compelling, and his arguments all semm quite sound. But in these types of books one must be careful to to judge it all. Its philosophy were talking about, and complete agreement is impossible. The debates are certainly not over, and there are some parts in Lycans thoughts that need a small bit of work. But these are bridging principle, and psychosemantic issues, which Lycan deliberately ignores. I recomend this book highly as yet another example that philosophers can make advancements in this trying topic.
Rating: 5 / 5